

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 198312
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011
DRAFTED BY:EUR/EE:THGERTH
APPROVED BY:EUR:WHLUERS
S/S-O:CASTRODALE
EUR/EE:CWSCHMIDT
-----112746 060353Z /11

R 050631Z AUG 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 198312

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT BUDAPEST 2916 ACTION SECSTATE DATED JULY 22, 1978.

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 2916

EXDIS

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: PDEV PEPR PGOV HU UR US, SHUM
SUBJECT: HARRIMAN-KADAR MEETING

BEGIN SUMMARY: GOVERNOR HARRIMAN MET JANOS KADAR JULY 18,
FOR A CORDIAL, FRANK, AND LENGTHY TWO-AND-A-HALF HOUR DIS-
CUSSION WHICH FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
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KADAR REFERERED TO MEETING HARRIMAN IN MOSCOW IN 1963 AND
RECALLED DETAILS OF CONVERSATIONS. HARRIMAN OUTLINED USG
POLICY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND EAST-WEST
ISSUES, EMPHASIZING THAT WE HAVE REACHED A CRITICAL POINT IN
THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. HE DETAILED BOTH THE POSITIVE AND
NEGATIVE FACTORS IN THE CURRENT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
AND UNDERLINED THE ROLE WHICH RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MUST
PLAY. KADAR ALSO ADDRESSED THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
AND URGED THAT U.S. RECOGNIZE THE PARAMETERS WITHIN WHICH THE
SOVIET LEADERSHIP MUST ACT. HE IDENTIFIED HUNGARY WITH SOVIET

POSITIONS, BUT WAS CAREFUL TO OUTLINE SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES IN THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIETS AND HUNGARIANS.

KADAR ALSO GAVE HARRIMAN A FASCINATING HISTORICAL REVIEW OF HUNGARIAN DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1956, WHOSE FAVORABLE COURSE HAD GIVEN HUNGARY A BASIS TO PURSUE A FOREIGN POLICY WHICH HAD LED TO NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. KADAR ENDORSED FURTHER STEPS IN U.S.-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FIELDS. END SUMMARY.

1. JANOS KADAR, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY, RECEIVED GOVERNOR HARRIMAN IN HIS OFFICE AT PARTY HEADQUARTERS JULY 18, FOR A WIDE-RANGING CONVERSATION WHICH LASTED TWO-AND-A-HALF HOURS, KADAR WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FONMIN PUJA AND AMBASSADOR ESZTERGALYOS; HARRIMAN BY AMBASSADOR KAISER. KADAR'S RECEPTION OF HARRIMAN WAS UNUSUALLY CORDIAL, REFLECTING NOT ONLY RESPECT FOR HARRIMAN AS A PERSON, BUT ALSO THE PRESENT STATE OF HUNGARIAN-U.S. RELATIONS.

2. THE DISCUSSION OPENED WITH KADAR SPEAKING FOR 50 STRAIGHT MINUTES ON HUNGARIAN DOMESTIC POLICY SINCE 1956 AND HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY, INCLUDING RELATIONS WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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THE U.S. AFTER A REPLY BY GOVERNOR HARRIMAN, WHICH FOCUSED ON EAST-WEST ISSUES, AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS FOLLOWED WHICH COVERED BOTH MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL TOPICS.

3. HUNGARIAN DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS: KADAR GAVE A FASCINATING HISTORICAL REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN HUNGARY SINCE 1956. REFERRING TO 1956, HE SAID THAT HUNGARY HAD NOTHING TO BE PROUD OF. HE ASSERTED, "THE PAST IS PAST." FOLLOWING THE REVOLUTION HE, KADAR, HAD WIPED THE SLATE CLEAN AND HAD EMBARKED ON HIS DOMESTIC "ALLIANCE POLICY" WHICH WAS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT "LOVE CANNOT BE ORDERED." RATHER, TOLERANCE OF DIFFERENT VIEWS HAD TO BE COUPLED WITH EFFORTS TO CONVINCE MORE PEOPLE TO SUPPORT THE POLICIES OF THE REGIME.

4. KADAR PROUDLY POINTED TO THE SUCCESS OF HIS ALLIANCE POLICY, WHICH HAS NOT ONLY PRODUCED DOMESTIC STABILITY AND PROGRESS, BUT HAS ALSO LAID A BASIS FOR HUNGARY'S FOREIGN POLICY. FOR EXAMPLE, BOTH THE REGIME AND THE CHURCHES HAVE REALIZED THEY MUST COEXIST WITH EACH OTHER. THE RESULT IS A PEACEFUL SITUATION, WHICH IN TURN ALLOWS SUCH DEVELOPMENTS AS THE BILLY GRAHAM VISIT OF LAST SEPTEMBER.

5. HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY: KADAR DESCRIBED THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY. HE STRESSED

THAT WITH ALL NATIONS HUNGARY BEHAVES OPENLY AND FRANKLY, FOLLOWING A PRINCIPLED FOREIGN POLICY IN THAT HE SAYS EXACTLY THE SAME THING TO BREZHNEV AS HE WOULD TO SCHMIDT. KADAR SAID THAT HUNGARY:

- IS LOYAL AND CORRECT WITH ITS ALLIES;
- FEELS SOLIDARITY WITH THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES;
- WANTS TO BE A CORRECT PARTNER WITH CAPITALIST COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE U.S., FRG, AND FRANCE. KADAR EMPHASIZED THAT HUNGARY'S PRECARIOUS GEOGRAPHICAL

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POSITION MAKES THE COUNTRY A FOREMOST PROPONENT OF PEACE.

6. RELATIONS WITH U.S.: KADAR SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED THE STEP-BY-STEP IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE OVER THE PAST YEARS. HE REFERRED TO THE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT, THE RETURN OF THE CROWN, AND THE TRADE AGREEMENT IN THIS CONNECTION. HE CONCLUDED THAT U.S.-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS ARE NORMALIZED, AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE ROLE OF PRESIDENT CARTER IN THIS ENDEAVOR. AS FOR THE FUTURE, KADAR SAW NO REASON WHY THERE SHOULD NOT BE CLOSER POLITICAL CONTACT BETWEEN OFFICIALS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, FULLER AND FREE DISCUSSIONS ON ALL INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST (ESPECIALLY TRADE), AND EXPANSION OF CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES. HE ENDORSED CSCE AS A USEFUL FORUM IN WHICH TO PURSUE THOSE ISSUES ON WHICH EAST AND WEST MAY NOT HAVE IDENTICAL VIEWS BUT HAVE MUTUAL INTERESTS IN SOLVING.

7. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION KADAR RETURNED TO CSCE, ASSERTING THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL BASKETS IS NECESSARY, NOT JUST THE THIRD BASKET. HE CLAIMED THAT THE U.S. WAS UNWISE IN OVEREMPHASIZING BASKET III, AND EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT INCREASED COOPERATIONS IN BASKETS I AND II WOULD LEAD TO MORE PROGRESS ON BASKET III THAN PRESENT U.S. POLICY.

8. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN, WHILE REFERRING TO BILATERAL ISSUES, MOVED THE CONVERSATION TO FOCUS ON GENERAL EAST-WEST ISSUES AND THE US-USSR RELATIONSHIP WHEN HE REPLIED TO KADAR'S OPENING STATEMENT. HARRIMAN EMPHASIZED TO KADAR PRESIDENT CARTER'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND, IN THIS REGARD, THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF

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SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. HE POINTED OUT THAT FAILURE IN SALT WOULD JEOPARDIZE NON-PROLIFERATION, ANOTHER ISSUE OF INTENSE INTEREST TO THE PRESIDENT. HARRIMAN THEN EXPLAINED TO KADAR THE

ROLE PUBLIC OPINION PLAYS IN THE UNITED STATES, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO RATIFICATION OF A POSSIBLE SALT AGREEMENT. IN THIS RESPECT, HE TOLD KADAR THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE U.S. PUBLIC TO UNDERSTAND SOVIET POLICY:

- ON THE CENTRAL FRONT IN EUROPE WHERE THEY ARE INCREASING THEIR ALREADY OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY IN TANKS;
- THEIR TREATMENT OF DISSIDENTS, ESPECIALLY THEIR CHARGE THAT SHCHARANSKY HAD WORKED WITH THE CIA AFTER PRESIDENT CARTER HAD CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE;

AND

- SOVIET ACTION IN AFRICA.

9. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE U.S. IS ENCOURAGED BY POSSIBLE PROGRESS IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HAVE BECOME CRUCIAL TO THE FUTURE OF DETENTE. OTHER POSSIBLE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS WOULD BE AGREEMENT ON A CTB AND COOPERATION RATHER THAN COMPETITION IN AFRICA. HARRIMAN URGED KADAR TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO HELP MOVE THE SOVIET LEADER SHIP, ESPECIALLY BREZHNEV, IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

10. KADAR RESPONDED TO HARRIMAN'S FRANK BUT FRIENDLY REMARKS IN A LIKE MANNER. HE READILY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IS THE KEY ELEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND CLAIMED THAT HE HAS OFTEN URGED RESTRAINT ON THE SOVIET LEADERS. HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE ADVICE HE HAD GIVEN KHRUSCHEV ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. KADAR EMPHASIZED THE CONCERN THE SOVIET UNION HAS FOR SECURITY, A CONCERN WHICH IS SO PERVASIVE THAT IT FEELS THREATENED BY THE U.S. INTEREST IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISSIDENTS IN THE USSR. HE ASSERTED THAT BREZHNEV IS A MAN OF PEACE WHOM HE, KADAR, HOPES

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WILL BE AROUND TO LEAD THE SOVIET UNION FOR MANY MORE YEARS.

11. KADAR ONCE AGAIN DREW ON HIS HUNGARIAN EXPERIENCE AFTER 1956 TO POINT OUT THAT PROGRESS IN SENSITIVE AREAS SOMETIMES TAKES LONGER, BUT THE ACHIEVEMENTS ARE MORE SOLID. HE CLAIMED THAT AFTER 1956 HUNGARY DELAYED AN AMNESTY IN ORDER TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT WAS ISSUING THE AMNESTY ON ITS OWN ACCORD AND NOT UNDER INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE. HE BELIEVES THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ACT LIKEWISE IF THEY ARE NOT FACED WITH TOO MUCH PRESSURE FROM THE WEST ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS. HE, AS HAD PUJA THE DAY BEFORE, URGED THE SILENT TREATMENT ON THESE SENSITIVE ISSUES.

12. AT SEVERAL POINTS IN THE CONVERSATION KADAR WAS CAREFUL TO POINT OUT DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVE BETWEEN HUNGARY AND THE SOVIET UNION. HE CLAIMED THAT HUNGARY'S GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION, AS WELL AS THE FACT

THAT HE AND OTHER HUNGARIAN LEADERS HAD LIVED UNDER BOTH SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM, WHILE THE SOVIET LEADERS HAD NOT, GAVE HUNGARY A MORE SOPHISTICATED PERSPECTIVE ON EAST-WEST ISSUES. HE CLAIMED TO UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERING U.S. AND SOVIET VIEWS ON THE VALUE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND BREZHNEV. HE SAID HE HAD URGED BREZHNEV TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT AT AN EARLY DATE IN ORDER TO INCREASE UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVE COMMUNICATION.

13. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING HARRIMAN ASKED KADAR ABOUT HIS OPINION OF POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA. KADAR REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE AND PRESENT YUGOSLAV POLICIES WOULD
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BE CONTINUED; THAT TITO HAD MADE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN EFFECTIVE SUCCESSION, WHICH HE FULLY SUPPORTED.

14. COMMENT: THE CONVERSATION WAS MARKED BY EXCEPTIONAL CORDIALITY AND FRANKNESS. THE EASY RAPPORT BETWEEN HARRIMAN AND KADAR WAS STRIKING. KADAR WAS OBVIOUSLY COMPLIMENTED BY THE GOVERNOR'S VISIT TO HUNGARY AND DELIGHTED TO SEE HIM AGAIN. KADAR'S VIGOR AND ANIMATION, WHICH WERE MATCHED BY THE GOVERNOR'S, WERE IMPRESSIVE. ALTHOUGH THE CONVERSATION LASTED TWO AND A HALF HOURS, IT SEEMED MUCH SHORTER THAN THAT AND ONE HAD THE FEELING THAT IT COULD EASILY HAVE GONE ON FOR SEVERAL MORE HOURS. THE VISIT RECEIVED EXCELLENT COVERAGE IN THE HUNGARIAN MEDIA.

15. WHEN AMBASSADOR KAISER SAW AMBASSADOR ESZTERGALYOS AT LUNCHEON AFTER THE MEETING WITH KADAR, ESZTERGALYOS TOLD HIM THAT KADAR HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED WITH THE FRANK AND FULL CONVERSATION WITH THE GOVERNOR. KADAR THOUGHT "IT WAS REMARKABLE THAT THIS GREAT FIGURE IN MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY CONTINUED TO BE SO CONCERNED ABOUT VITAL WORLD ISSUES AND TO BE SO WELL INFORMED ABOUT THEM."
KAISEVR UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, MEETINGS, EAST WEST MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 aug 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE198312
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter:
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
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Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D780322-0180
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197808122/baaazlo.tel
Line Count: 263
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 11d1f759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 mar 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1587838
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: HARRIMAN-KADAR MEETING
TAGS: PDEV, PEPR, PGOV, SHUM, HU, UR, US, (KADAR, JANOS), (HARRIMAN, AVERELL)
To: BELGRADE BUCHAREST MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/11d1f759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

